This paper investigates the position of social-democratic parties (SDPs) towards antitrust (competition) policy. Given their traditional state-interventionist attitude and their ties with organized labour, SDPs have long been considered as not supportive of antitrust policy. However, antitrust policy's goal of granting consumers lower prices is beneficial to salary-earners. Hence, it is not surprising that SDPs' support for antitrust policy varies considerably. To account for such variation, this paper hypothesizes that SDPs' support for antitrust policy depends on: a) the influence of 1 trade unions; b) the electoral system; and c) the degree of coordination of the economy. Analysing in depth 16 party manifestos of West European SDPs from 2002 to 2013, we check the plausibility of our hypotheses with 7 paired comparisons. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that the influence of trade unions affects SDPs' support for antitrust policy, while the impact of electoral system and economic coordination appears less evident.
tional SDPs' values and vigorous antitrust enforcement. According to a leading American social democrat, for example, a reliable antitrust regime is fully compatible with the goals of SDPs, because its aim is to avoid that "corporate behemoths" may "maintain market share and profitability despite little innovation" (Kenworthy, 2014: 104-5 ; see also Sassoon, 1997: 250; Amato, 1997; Monti, 2001) . Also, regarding the purported incompatibility between antitrust and social democracy, scholars note that the German ordo-liberal tradition (Gerber, 1998) and the Scandinavian model (Kenworthy, 2014) have been able to reconcile the state-market dichotomy, safeguarding both economic competition and welfare state.
So, the literature is divided. However, if one sought to answer the question of whether antitrust is compatible with social democracy by looking at what SDPs actually promise in their manifestos, no straightforward answer would emerge. Even a cursory look at national SDP programmes reveals great variation. Such variation is visible even among parties whose countries are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ('OECD'), the European Union ('EU'), and the European Economic Area ('EEA'). Within that group, noteworthy differences exist even among parties which are members of the International Socialist and the Party of European Socialists. Further, these differences do not seem to correspond either to differences in attitudes towards the process of European integration or to developments in EU competition law. The empirical puzzle we seek to address is thus the following: why do these parties, which are similar in so many respects, differ so much in terms of their sponsoring of antitrust policy as a solution to power-related market failures? 3 To answer that question we examine the plausibility of three different explanations which are all derived from a common rational institutionalist framework. First, the strength of the relations between the SDP and trade unions conditions the ability of party leaders to appeal to small businesses, and hence their ability to commit to pro-small business antitrust. Second, the proportionality of the electoral system creates more or less strong threats on a SDP's ideological left, and hence affects the political attractiveness of the policy. And third, the degree of coordination of the economy (i.e. the "variety of capitalism") defines how compatible antitrust is with other institutions, and hence makes it more or less politically attractive. Based on seven systematically selected comparisons and a wealth of triangulated primary and secondary sources, we conclude that the null hypothesis (a) can probably be rejected for the strength of trade union influence (i.e. the more a party depends on trade union support, the less it will support vigorous antitrust regulation); (b) might need to be considered in greater detail for the electoral system (i.e. SDPs in more proportional systems might be less inclined to propose strong antitrust measures); (c) can certainly not be rejected for the degree of coordination of the economy (i.e. the "variety of capitalism" does not seem to affect SDPs' positioning on antitrust).
These findings are relevant for at least three literatures. First, in comparative politics, they contribute to our deeper understanding of the variable nature of social democracy, including SDPs' electoral strategies and the profound impact of globalization and postmodernity on these parties. Whereas many interesting studies have explored the possibilities of social-democratic politics and policies in advanced industrial societies (e.g. and which are due to the excessive market power that some undertakings or groups of undertakings might acquire. They are different from other kinds of market failures such as public goods, negative externalities, or limited information. Berman, 2006; Delwit, 2004; Kay, 2012; Kenworthy, 2014) , none has done so by looking at antitrust policy as an instrument in the electoral toolkit of these parties. Second, in public policy in general, and the study of regulatory policies in particular, understanding when SDPs endorse antitrust regulation offers privileged insights into the nature of such ideologically ambivalent policies. Here the relevant debate is between those who interpret all market-based supply-side policies such as antitrust as essentially non-social democratic instruments (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1985; Gerber, 1998; Meyer, 2007) , and those who admit that at least some versions of antitrust are compatible with the broader ideological apparatus of social democracy (e.g. Amato, 1997; Crouch, 2012; Wigger and Nölke, 2007; Wilks, 1999) . Third, a number of scholars have argued that governing coalitions delegate powers to non-majoritarian institutions in order to lock-in policies against future attacks by differently-minded governing coalitions (e.g. Moe, 1990; Gilardi, 2008; Thatcher, 2005) . This thesis seems to be confirmed by the delegation of extensive powers by centre-right governments to independent antitrust regulators in such diverse countries as Austria (2005, popular party), France (1986, Gaullist party), Germany (1957, centreright coalition) , Greece (1977 , popular party), Norway (2005 , centre-right coalition), or Sweden (2008 . What remains to be seen, however, is whether SDPs truly pose a uniform and permanent threat to antitrust policies. Below, Section 2 introduces an informal model of antitrust preferences of SDPs and proposes three main hypotheses. Section 3 offers some methodological comments regarding the operationalization of our variables, our sources of information, the qualitative case selection technique we follow, and the basis of our inferences. Section 4 presents our comparative case studies. Section 5 concludes.
Historically, most SDPs represented the interests of the working class, defined as the nonasset owning segment of the population with a high propensity to spend. Accordingly, SDPs focused more on interventions to modify market outcomes and redistribute wealth, and less on hands-off, market-based mechanisms aimed at maximizing growth (Boix, 1998) . Regarding structural microeconomic policies, nationalizations and/or hands-on regulation (i.e. not antitrust) are the kinds of solutions that are widely perceived as offering the best fit with SDP ideology. According to a legal historian, the support of SDPs for antitrust "has seldom been intense and committed [and] competition as a value does not fit easily with the rhetoric of left-oriented parties" (Gerber, 1998: 425 ).
Yet that is not conclusive evidence of the supposed incompatibility of SDP politics and antitrust ideology. Several SDP thinkers and politicians have been advocates of vigorous antitrust enforcement (Amato, 1997; Kenworthy, 2014; Giddens, 1999; Van Miert, 2001 ).
As for parties, the British, French, German, and even Italian SDPs have often strongly supported new antitrust legislation. In 1948, Clement Attlee's Labour government passed Britain's first antitrust legislation. In 1989, the French socialist presidency of the EU did not veto, and perhaps even actively backed the first Merger Regulation. Other examples abound. Accordingly, in what follows we assume that vote-maximizing SDP leaders can choose whether to propose (or not) antitrust policy. Their choice depends on the costs and benefits of doing so.
Regarding the redistributive consequences of antitrust policy, consider a situation where technological advances render economies of scale, transaction costs, and barriers to entry increasingly important. Markets will concentrate, and cartels, tacit oligopolistic coordi-nation, long-term contracting, and monopoly power appear. Such a trend affects not only the public at large, but also the more competitively-structured sectors of the economy.
If, as is most likely, private market power is not evenly distributed across nations, economic sectors and firms, political turmoil may occur -as it did in the 1880s America, or in the 1930s Germany. Further, the capture of the unevenly distributed monopolistic rents by a portion of the labour force will create inequalities. Although some workers (those employed in the relevant industries) will undoubtedly benefit, their gains will also contribute positively to the social costs of private monopoly (Weiss 1966) . 4 Finally, in so far as economic theory supports the view that increased competition at home is the best means to achieve higher rates of innovation and/or international competitiveness, politicians will have an incentive to protect and even foster domestic competition. Under these circumstances, SDPs may consider antitrust regulation.
On the other hand, if private market power can indeed lead to supra-normal profits, and if labour is organized, then the unions can capture a portion of monopolists' rents -the famous "monopoly wages" (Weiss 1966) . This renders antitrust a politically less attractive option, particularly for parties which represent wage-earners. 5 Indeed, monopoly wages are not just typically higher than competitive wages: provided that labour is unionized, they also bite into total employers' surplus, often at a level of more than 50% (Karier 1985) . It follows that anti-competitive markets (a) penalize most workers only a little, (b) benefit asset-owners to some extent, and (c) profit to a concentrated group of workers a lot. In addition, relatively bigger firms facilitate labour unionism because their workers face lower transaction costs at the moment of organizing and negotiating with managers, and have lower turnover rates. Moreover, even some small businesses may actually benefit from anti-competitive practices such as long-term contracting, accommodating price-fixing, or market-sharing agreements. Overall, this concentration of benefits, combined with the dispersal of costs, makes competition enforcement a politically risky option, particularly for SDPs.
With this in mind, we propose a theory of the political economy of SDPs' support for antitrust policy which rests on five reasonable assumptions. First, as far as this paper is concerned, policy options for the regulation of markets are essentially one-dimensional, and they go from outright nationalizations to complete laissez-faire. Between the two extremes, the choice that most SDPs face is that between the more interventionist ex ante regulation of markets and the more liberal antitrust enforcement.
Second, socio-economic actors view antitrust as instrumental in bringing prices closer to their competitive equilibrium level, and in improving the quality of goods and services.
Competition compresses profits, and hence wages. Conversely, rent-seeking monopolies favour organized labour activities, and therefore consolidate the positive relationship between employer size and wages (e.g. Black and Strahan 2001, Brown and Medoff 1989) .
Third, different socio-economic actors have different ideal points, which are common knowledge. The preferences of socio-economic actors are single-peaked decreasing functions of the distance between policy proposals and the agent's ideal point. First, trade unions represent working-class interests, which include both high wages and low prices (workers have comparatively low disposable incomes, and so prices affect them comparatively more). Yet, the mandate of trade unionists is biased in favour of job security, wages increases, and improvements in working conditions. It does not include bringing prices to their competitive level. Second, most small and medium-sized enterprises ('SMEs') and non-politicized consumers support vigorous antitrust. Even though some SMEs may benefit from restrictive price agreements, vertical price-fixing, and/or excessive monopolistic prices, on average they seek the protection of static competition. Conversely, firms with an important market share in a relevant product and geographic market on average benefit more from the absence of antitrust (Bittlingmayer 1992, McChesney and Shughart 1996) .
Finally, some SMEs and big capitalists favour industrial policy or laissez-faire.
Fourth, political parties tend to represent different socio-economic groups, but their preferences over non-constitutive, non-salient policies such as antitrust are those of officeseekers (vote-maximizers). Thus, SDPs' objective utility functions are flat within some distance around the ideal points of the groups they represent: within certain limits, their preferences are not totally exogenous to the balance of power between neighbouring socio-economic actors. 6 Hence, within those limits, antitrust can be traded in exchange for votes and/or contributions. 6 Communists prefer nationalizations and/or regulation; socialists prefer regulation and/or antitrust; liberals prefer antitrust; conservatives prefer antitrust and/or laissez-faire; and the far-right prefers laissezfaire and/or corporatism. Hence, the further away a political party is from the liberal "centre", the less it is likely to advocate a strong competition policy. For example, communist (state-monopolistic) and far-right support by trade unions. SDP leaders know that, if they promise vigorous antitrust enforcement, voters will interpret it as favouring lower prices, lower profits, and hence lower wages. This will appeal to SMEs, but it will alienate trade unions. If, on the other hand, SDP leaders promise permissive antitrust enforcement (e.g. direct regulation or even outright nationalizations), this will be interpreted as favouring higher prices, higher profits, and therefore higher wages. This attracts trade unions, but also alienates SMEs.
Now consider the case where unions are strong -i.e. where the unionization and concentration rates are high. To gain enough SME support to compensate for even a slight increase in competition (and hence a decline in financial, political, and moral support by trade unions), SDP leaders will have to promise policies close to the ideological centre.
This is a high-risk strategy, because centrist and centre-right parties will react to attract their natural constituents (SMEs and consumers), thereby increasing these constituencies' elasticity of demand for SDP policies. Hence, in equilibrium, where unions are strong, the SDP party leadership should not promise a lot on antitrust. Conversely, of course, trade unions may be weak and split. Where that is the case, and therefore where SMEs/consumers are relatively stronger, to compensate for even a slight loss of competition, the concessions the SDP leadership would need to make to trade unions would need to be considerable. Hence, the party leadership will deem such a left turn non-worthwhile, and will promise a vigorous antitrust policy. Following this analysis, the crucial question becomes, what are the determinants of trade union power over the electoral strategy of an SDP? We propose a three-fold answer:
Firstly, and rather obviously, trade unions are strong when they can exercise control over the SDP leadership. Not only may the party rely on them for financial support, but they may also have the institutional to write the electoral manifesto, or to elect the party leadership and hold it accountable. A typical example of this would be the British Labour Party in the 1980s. In such cases it will be very risky for the SDP leadership to attempt to gain enough SME support to compensate for even a light increase in antitrust (and hence a partial loss of trade union support) -and vice versa. Hence, our first hypothesis is that:
The greater the influence of trade unions on an SDP, the less the party will promise on antitrust policy.
Second, trade unions are strong when there exists a credible leftist political alternative to the SDP. More specifically, the presence of an electorally strong communist, Green, or "old-left" party offers the unions a comfortable fallback position should they fall out with the SDP leaders, and hence increases the elasticity of their demand for policies. For example, where the electoral system and the distribution of voters' preferences allow for the presence of a potentially strong leftist party, trade unions will exhibit a very high elasticity of demand for antitrust policy. A typical example might be Italy, where the leadership of the Partito Democratico and its predecessors is sometimes constrained by the ability of the unions to back a potentially powerful leftist opposition. In such cases, the unions can desert the SDP faster than SMEs are able to join in support of it. Conversely, where the leftist opposition does not seem a credible electoral threat, the threat of trade unions will not be sub-game perfect, and therefore the SDP leadership will have more leeway to sponsor antitrust policy. Our second hypothesis is:
H2: The strongest the (potential) electoral threat on the left, the less an SDP party will promise on antitrust policy.
Third, trade unions are strong when the SDP leadership cannot easily champion policies which increase the party's appeal to the liberal centre. This is the case where the political economy of the country is characterized by strong coordination institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001) . More analytically, economic policies usually exhibit a certain degree of complementarity (Boyer and Saillard 2001) . A proposal for a policy change in some area must either be accompanied by a wider reformist agenda, or it will be perceived as cheap talk. Accordingly, a SDP proposal to reinforce antitrust enforcement will be more credible in a liberal than in a coordinated market economy -and vice versa. Therefore, our third hypothesis states that:
H3: The more coordinated a national political economy, the less the SDP will be able to credibly commit to more antitrust enforcement.
We are aware that statistical testing may yield accurate and generalizable results in the research on party manifestos. However, we find that existing databases of party manifestos do not properly distinguish between antitrust and other forms of regulation, and therefore suffer from problems of measurement error. Manifesto Project Database code 403, for example, yields the same score for quasi-sentences on antitrust (e.g. "cartels will be fined") and for traditional (i.e. anti-competitive) regulation (e.g. "utilities' prices will be capped"). Hence, having to choose between reliability and validity, we opt for the latter. We do so by conducting a series of controlled qualitative comparisons, where cases are selected on the basis of the variation of one independent variable at a time (King et al., 1994) .
Regarding the use of electoral manifestos to derive the SDPs' stance on antitrust policy, we consider them as the most reliable and comparable source to gather information on the parties' policy formulation. We know that there can be relevant differences between what
parties promise and what they actually do. Yet the research on manifestos is an important part of scientific studies on parties in general (see e.g. Budge et al. 2001 , Klingemann et al. 2007 ) and specifically on SDPs (e.g. Wolinetz 1993 , Volkens 2004 . Moreover, considering different sources in our study would make the unit homogeneity assumption not tenable, and would make comparisons more arbitrary and difficult to interpret.
Regarding the operationalization of the variables, we take "union influence on an SDP" to be a function of not only the formal institutional rules that regulate the union-party relationship, but also of informal features which necessarily affect that relationship. For example, in 2000 the British and the Danish trade unions had roughly equivalent formal powers to influence their respective SDPs; yet Tony Blair's media-based politics made it so that the former had considerably less real influence than the latter. For Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden -the cases we knew less well -we conducted two expert interviews per country. This yields the classification shown in the first column of Table 1 below.
To take a few examples, in Denmark union density has always been high, at around 74%. Turning to the second independent variable, we only need to classify electoral systems from most majoritarian to most proportional. To do so, we have collected information from the ACE project at www.aceproject.org, and have cross-checked and interpreted that information using chapter 13 of the second edition of Principles of Comparative Politics (Roberts Clark et al. 2013) . So, for example, the UK's Single-Member Plurality System places it at the majoritarian extreme, followed by France whose two-round majority runoff system for the presidential elections and its two-round majority plurality system for the ensuing general elections also create important anti-proportional effects. Austria's and Ireland's Hare systems place them at the proportional end of the spectrum.
As regards the degree of coordination, we rely on the indices of coordination in corporate governance and coordination in labour market calculated by Guardiancich and Guidi (2015) , which are based on the same methodology used by Hall and Gingerich (2009) . As mentioned above, for the dependent variable we have avoided relying on premature quantification, and have opted instead for a purely qualitative approach. Accordingly, our operationalization focuses on the antitrust-related pronouncements of SDPs in their respective electoral programs in a specific election year. Electoral programmes were read from the beginning to the end, collecting all antitrust-related statements, including those that might only appear in specialized chapters (e.g. chapters on environmental protection, on agriculture, or on culture). To maximize validity, reliability, and communicability of our measurements and findings we base our case studies on extensive quotes from these texts, giving more weight to general (i.e. economy-wide) pronouncements and less weight to sector-specific ones.
The result is Table 1 , which forms the basis of our case selection. Each column lists an independent variable, and a number of SDP electoral manifestos are ranked according to their score on that variable. All cases listed in Table 1 share a certain number of characteristics, which can therefore be deemed to be controlled for: advanced industrial democracy status (e.g. membership of OECD); EU/EEA membership; and SDP with experience of government. We have also limited the population by only considering cases between 2002 and 2013, thus controlling, among other things, for the secular decline of communism and the development of European antitrust and merger case law. In selecting cases for comparison we have also tried to take parties from equally-sized countries, thereby controlling for trade openness and thus the intensity of import-competition.
Finally, regarding our inferences, we rely on a combination of within-case assessment and the more usual correlational logic. The most important rule at this stage has been to examine the plausibility of different causal claims by privileging the null hypothesis. In the conclusion we come back to the issue of possible omitted variable bias.
Comparative case studies
This section presents seven comparative case studies. For presentational reasons, we proceed to test the plausibility of our three hypotheses in reverse order. Hence, the first two comparisons assess the impact of the level of coordination of an economy; the third and fourth, the impact of the electoral system; and the fifth, sixth and seventh, the influence of trade unions. Regarding Labour's positioning on antitrust in 2007, it was rather ambiguous. In his forward to the manifesto Rabbitte did write that "it is the task of government to confront the arbitrary interests and the concentrations of power which hold people back." Similarly, in the main text Labour did promise to "adequately resource the competition authority to pursue rigorous competition enforcement". These relatively vague statements, however, are considerably shorter than the party's detailed plans on more hands-on regulation. At the very least, there is no evidence that LP was more pro-antitrust than was its Austrian counterpart. Regarding Labour's positioning on antitrust, it declared that "competition is a driving force for innovation [and] our competition regime has been toughened with independent competition bodies and stronger penalties" and that "we will continue to work to protect the rights of consumers". That was a less enthusiastic endorsement of the policy than in The SPD's manifesto remained remarkably ambiguous on antitrust. On the one hand, it did briefly declare that SPD was "in favour of competition and antitrust policy", and it did state it would pursue an antitrust policy protecting small and medium-sized enterprises.
On the other hand, it assured that fair competition should not be protected at the expense of wages and working conditions, and that "a new phase of cooperation, rather than just competition, must begin". In coherence with that statement, the SPD promised to protect services of general economic interest, to regulate financial and energy markets, and to create "industrial policy opportunities". In conformity with H2, we interpret this as less pro-antitrust than the British Labour's stance. In conformity with H1, in both 2003 and 2007 the Belgian PS run on a considerably less pro-antitrust ticket than its Greek counterpart. For the PS, EU treaties must be amended to insert a social-policy goal for all policies, including the internal market and antitrust, for "market regulation cannot be limited to classical antitrust regulation". At the institutional level, "the state must guarantee the general interest [and] regulators must be autonomous and impartial but should not adopt policies which contradict those defined by the legitimate political authorities." In 2007, it noted that "even if competition has some positive effects, it also has some limits", which can be seen in the poor quality of utility provisions in Sweden and the UK. These statements contrast sharply with those of the centre-right Parti Réformateur, which took a decidedly pro-antitrust stance on both occasions.
As regards Greece, in 2004 PASOK promised to "adopt an effective regulatory framework that secures competition and consumer protection". After advocating the liberalization of regulated markets -including the professions -it defended its record on pro-competition privatizations, and promised a constitutional reform to create autonomous regulators, including an antitrust authority. Finally, it announced it would work towards empowering consumers' associations in their role of guardians of competition. This, too, confirms H1.
Conclusions
Based on the careful examination of fifteen SDP electoral manifestos and seven systematic comparisons, we have qualitatively tested three hypotheses about the determinants of SDPs' support for antitrust policy (see Table 2 ). We found preliminary evidence in support of our first hypothesis -namely, that a greater influence of trade unions on SDPs results in less pro-antitrust positions. The ten cases which go into our three comparisons on this dimension give preliminary support to the idea that the null hypothesis might be rejectable. If that is so, then unions may still have a way to influence policy -provided they are not evicted from the party.
Concerning H2, which hypothesized that a more proportional electoral system increases the chances of opposing antitrust policy, the evidence is more uncertain. Although one controlled comparison lent strong support to H2, the other did not. Given the centrality of this kind of institutional variables in the comparative politics literature (e.g. Chang et al., 2010), we believe that this is certainly an area where more theorizing and more empirical work are needed.
Hypotheses Findings
H1: The greater the influence of trade unions on an SDP, Confirmed the less the party will promise on antitrust policy H2: The strongest the (potential) electoral threat on the left, Mixed evidence the less an SDP party will promise on antitrust policy H3: The more coordinated a national political economy, the less the Not confirmed SDP will be able to credibly commit to more antitrust enforcement Tab. 2: Summary of the main findings Finally, as regards H3, the empirical analysis does not indicate any impact of the level of coordination of an economy on the positioning of a SDP on antitrust policy. The eight cases which inform our first two comparisons seem to show that "varieties of capitalism" do not matter. One interpretation of this result may be that Europeanization and globalization fritter away system-wide peculiarities.
Four steps may be taken in order to further explore this topic and define a political economy of antitrust. The first is testing the hypotheses derived from a more precise model with quantitative data. Particular attention should be devoted, in this case, to the operationalization of the dependent variable: how can 'support for antitrust' be measured in a consistent away across time and countries? How should mentions and non-mentions of antitrust policy be treated? Although such approaches have limitations, a time-series-cross-section dataset would have the advantage of letting us control for all possible explanatory and intervening variable in a much more accurate way. The second step to take involves analysing the evolution of SDPs' attitude towards antitrust through time. We know that SDPs have gradually come to embrace elements of (neo-)liberalism in their programmes (see Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011 , for an overview), but how this has happened, and why it has happened earlier and more explicitly in some countries and not in others is an issue worth exploring. Third, it would be important to also go beyond manifestos, looking not only at what SDPs say, but also at what they do. Is the variation we found in statements on anti-trust policy reflected in a different approach to competition legislation and enforcement? This is particularly interesting in the EU, where a common antitrust policy ties the hands of national governments. Are SDPs different from right-wing parties, and different from each other, when it comes to antitrust implementation? Finally, given that our research has highlighted the influence of trade unions on social-democratic parties in Europe, we think that a political economy of antitrust would strongly benefit from more specific knowledge of the attitudes of trade unions towards antitrust policy. Do they consistently advocate more hands-on regulation, or do they also support antitrust enforcement under certain conditions? These questions ultimately relate to the relationship between the European labour movement, which was born and prospered in the golden age of welfare state, and nowadays' globalized capitalism, which challenges the very existence of social democracy.
